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Abstract:
In  the  past  30  years,  microfinance  has  carried  many  promises  of  social  and 
economic transformation, with the shift towards targeting women being seen as a 
major strategic move through which the promise of social development could be 
most effectively delivered. However, ethnographic studies have shown that  many 
women relinquish the use of their loans to male members of the household, belying 
the  empowering  promise  of  microfinance.  We  propose  a  simple  model  of 
household bargaining which examines how  providing women with credit affects 
production  and  decision-making  power  in  the  household.  Following  Bergstrom 
(1996),  we  account  for  the  roles  of  both  divorce  and  non-cooperation  in  the 
household as relevant fall-back options in the bargaining strategy of each spouse. 
We show that the introduction of a microcredit programme is likely to have widely 
heterogeneous impacts,  and can adversely affect  the  bargaining power of  some 
women. We demonstrate that access to credit  allows a woman to strengthen her 
bargaining position through an expansion of her autonomous activities (the causal 
mechanism hoped for) only under very specific circumstances: when she is able to 
invest her new capital profitably in an autonomous activity, and her husband has no 
alternative activity in which the same capital would generate comparable returns. 
The case in which the availability of credit is most likely to strengthen women's 
bargaining  position  in  the  household  is  when  capital  can  be  invested  in  a 
cooperative activity in which both spouses contribute in an important way.
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1  Introduction : Microfinance and the Promise of Social Change
In the past 30 years, microfinance has carried many promises of social and economic 
transformation, with the shift towards targeting women being seen as a major strategic 
move  through  which  the  promise  of  social  development  could  be  most  effectively 
delivered.  It is argued that  enabling women to generate their own independent income 
would help tip the balance of power within the household in their favour and allow them 
to negotiate a larger share of household resources. Because women are more likely than 
men to invest in household public goods, enlarging the scope for women's (as opposed to 
men's) employment through access to microcredit  is believed to be the most effective 
channel  to  deliver  wider  social  benefits  (Armendariz  de  Aghion and Morduch 2005, 
Khandker 2003, Pitt et al. 2006).1
This virtuous sequence of events linking targeting women for the delivery of credit to 
poverty alleviation is premised on women's enhanced ability to exert greater autonomous 
control over resources and has been justified on both theoretical and empirical grounds. 
Empirically,  a substantial  and  growing  body  of  evidence  has  shown  that  increasing 
resources  in  the  hands  of  women  (rather  than  men's)  has  greater  impacts  on  family 
welfare, in particular children's health (child survival and nutrition rates) and education 
(Duflo 2005, World Bank 2001).2 This social motive for targeting women has been a 
strong motivation behind poverty-oriented microfinance programmes such as FINCA or 
the Grameen Bank.3
Analytically,  the  foundations  for  such  an  approach  can  be  found  in  bargaining 
models of the household which posit that household members can obtain a greater share 
1  In addition, because women are believed to be more risk-averse, easier to monitor, and more amenable 
to  the  threat  of  social  sanctions  than men,  targeting  women would also contribute  to  the  financial 
sustainability of microfinance programmes as evidenced by women's higher repayment rates compared 
to  men's.  See  Cull,  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Morduch  (2008)  for  a  recent  overview  of  the  financial 
sustainability debate.
2 Note Edmonds (2005)'s contrary finding that children aged 13 to 17 were more likely to attend school 
when they lived with a eligible male recipient of a new pension transfer, than when they lived with an 
eligible female recipient.
3 Susan Davis, chair of US -based Grameen Foundation explained “There has been research that shows 
that when women make financial decisions, greater disposable income goes into improved nutrition, 
health status, and housing for their children and families. That's why the industry shifted. When 
Grameen started, it was just trying to reach 50-50 parity between men and women, but then they noticed 
the difference.” 
http://knowledge.allianz.com/en/globalissues/microfinance/microcredit/davis_microfinance_women_gr
ameen.html. Accessed October 8, 2008. For FINCA, whose borrowers are 70 percent women, see 
http://www.gdrc.org/icm/finca/finca-2.html. Accessed on October 8, 2008.
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of household resources by improving their fall-back options. Threat or fall-back options 
capture  the  level  of  welfare  available  to  each  spouse  in  case  of  a  breakdown in  the 
bargaining process taking place in the household. The empowering effect of microfinance 
programmes is expected to materialise through their  effects  on two types of fall-back 
options: the  utility levels  attained by each spouse in case of  divorce or exit  from the 
marriage;  and  the utility  levels  attained  when each spouse retreats  to  an autonomous 
sphere within the household.  In keeping with this theoretical literature, proxies used in 
the empirical literature to measure relative bargaining power in the households include 
assets brought at marriage, unearned income, or inherited assets, over which each spouse 
retains  separate  control  within  marriage,  or  exogenous  policies  that  affect  men  and 
women's  outside  options  such  as  divorce  or  employment  laws  (Adam  et  al.  2003, 
Fafchamps et al. 2006, Thomas et al. 2002). All (explicitly or implicitly) take the view 
that greater family welfare can be attained by increasing women's autonomous control 
over resources.
However,  transferring  the  above  reasoning  to  microfinance  is  far  from 
straightforward. While women may readily keep control over cash benefits transferred to 
them,  by  contrast,  loans  enter  a  complex  decision-making  process  with  perplexing 
impacts  on the  outcomes  of the bargaining  process.4 In particular,  there is  congruent 
evidence that many women relinquish the use of their loans, in part or in whole, to their 
spouses  (Goetz  and  Gupta  1996,  Kabeer  2001,  Rahman  1999).  For  instance,  in  an 
ethnographic study of the operations of Grameen Bank in a Bangladeshi village, Rahman 
(2001) showed that 78 percent of loans granted to women were used by male members of 
the household (i.e. their husbands or sons). Similarly, Goetz and Gupta (1996) report that 
56 percent of loans borrowed by women were invested in male activities. In a study of a 
group lending programme conducted by one of us in Kyrgyzstan, almost all group loans 
(97.5 percent),  irrespective of the gender of the borrower,  were allocated to livestock 
breeding, an activity traditionally controlled by men with some inputs by women  (Ngo 
2008).
The fact that women pass on their loans to male members of the household has been 
interpreted by some as evidence of women losing control over their loans, casting doubt 
on  the  empowering  potential  of  microfinance.  The  focus  is  on  women  as  primary 
decision-makers and having autonomous control over loans use and/or loan management. 
Another  interpretation  has  been  proposed  by  Kabeer  (1998,  2001),  who  argues  that 
4 See  Rutherford  (2002)  for  an  ethnographic  account  of  the  complexity  of  the  financial  (loans  and 
savings) portfolio handled by low-income households in Bangladesh.
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women  placed  in  situations  of  unequal  interdependence  within  the  family,  and  with 
limited  options  outside  of  marriage,  may  prefer  interventions  that  strengthen  the 
household as a whole rather than seek to improve their individual situations. As Kabeer 
explained:
“[Women had] a much stronger stake in strengthening cooperation, and minimizing 
conflict  within  the  family.  Unequal  interdependence  within  the  family,  and 
women's greater vulnerability outside it, explain why the women loanees sought 
greater  equality  within the family as a result of their access to credit rather than 
greater  independence  from  it.  It  explains,  for  instance,  the  significance  they 
invested  in  their  ability  to  bring  a  valued  resource  into  the  household  and  to 
contribute directly to household income.” 
The scope for women to  invest  capital  in  purely autonomous  activities  is  clearly 
circumscribed by gender norms that delineate the division of labour and responsibilities 
between  men  and women  in  the  household  and the  wider  community.5 For  instance, 
social  conventions  and gender  norms  regarding  the  divisions  of  labour  may obligate 
women to remain near the home to take care of children, or restrain their ability to travel 
to markets. These constraints explain why women are limited to fewer and less profitable 
business ventures than men (de Mel et al. 2007, 2008, Emran et al. 2006, Johnson 2004, 
Johnston and Morduch 2007).6 Unequal interdependence between spouses also explains 
why women are more dependent on the contribution of male household members for the 
conduct of their  businesses than men are on women's inputs.  Limitations on women's 
self-employment  opportunities  has  been  widely  documented.  For  example,  in 
Bangladesh, where the practice of purdah puts considerable limits on women's mobility 
in the public space, women who invest their loans in their own activities remain bound to 
home-based activities (e.g. poultry or milk cow rearing) in line with traditions stipulating 
that these activities are managed by women. Loans used by men and women in joint 
enterprises also retain the same gender structure, for example with women making puffed 
rice  or  sweet,  which  are  then  sold  by  their  husbands  (Anderson and Eswaran  2007, 
Hashemi et al. 1996, Kabeer 1998).
To disentangle how microcredit programmes targeted at women can be expected to 
shift the balance of power in the household,  we develop  a simple model of household 
5 This perspective appears most clearly from ethnographic studies of microfinance,  which are rich in 
contextual details. See Johnson (2004), Kabeer (1998), Kabeer (2001), Mayoux (1999), Rahman (1999).
6 In  a  recent  study  on  the  profitability  of  micro-enterprises  in  Sri  Lanka,  De  Mel,  McKenzie  and 
Woodruff (2008) find that mean returns to capital are zero among female-owned enterprises and that 
more than half of the enterprises owned by women have negative returns, compared to 20 percent for 
men.
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bargaining that allows us to distinguish between three types of interventions that affect (i) 
the  return  to  a  cooperative  endeavour  involving  both spouses;  (ii)  the  return  to  each 
spouse's autonomous activities within the household; and (iii) each spouse's exit option. 
Following Bergstrom (1996), we propose  a model which accounts for the role of  both 
divorce  and  non-cooperation  in  the  household  as  relevant  fall-back  options  in  the 
bargaining  strategy  of  each  spouse.  Our  model  contrasts  with  axiomatic  models  of 
intrahousehold  bargaining,  which  solve  the  bargaining  problem by  assuming  ex-ante 
what the relevant threat point will be (Lundberg and Pollak 1993, Manser and Brown 
1980, McElroy and Horney 1981).
Given the limits on women's ability to earn an independent income, we pay particular 
attention to how access to a new resource that enlarges the scope for cooperation in the 
household affect the relative bargaining power of spouses.  Our focus on cooperation in 
the  household  echoes  recent  concerns  about  the  consequences  of  excluding  men  in 
microfinance (Armendariz de Aghion and Roome 2008) or health (Mullany et al. 2005) 
programmes,  when  their  participation  is  important  for  programme  success.  Since 
production decisions regarding loan use affect the fall-back options of the spouses, we 
also explore the situation when the male spouse may have an incentive to appropriate the 
loan to maintain his own bargaining power within the household. 
We find that access to credit  allows a woman to strengthen her bargaining position 
through  an  expansion  of  her  autonomous  activities  only  under  very  specific 
circumstances:  when  the  woman  is  able  to  invest  her  new  capital  profitably  in  an 
autonomous activity and her husband has no alternative activity in which the same capital 
would generate comparable returns. The case in which the availability of credit is most 
likely to strengthen women's bargaining position in the household is when capital can be 
invested in a cooperative activity in which both spouses contribute in an important way. 
We also show that the impact of any type of intervention depends critically on whether or 
not divorce is a credible threat point.
The next section sets up our model of household bargaining and interprets it in the 
context  of  an  intervention  providing  women  with  access  to  new  capital.  We  then 
represent and distinguish between four types of intrahousehold relations and predict how 
access to credit affects production and bargaining power in the household in each case. 
We illustrate the model's predictions by drawing on ethnographic studies of the outcomes 
of  microfinance  programmes.  Section  3  concludes  with  further  discussions  of  our 
theoretical results.
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2  Cooperative Gains and Bargaining Power within the Household
In many societies, divorce carries a particularly high cost and non-cooperation within 
the household may constitute a more credible threat-point than divorce for most women. 
This insight was prominently put forward by Lundberg and Pollack (1994), who define 
the non-cooperative threat point as a "division of labour based on socially recognized and 
sanctioned  gender  roles".  Short  of  marriage  dissolution,  spouses  retreat  to  'separate 
spheres' within the marriage where they each fulfill their gender roles and where the non-
cooperative  equilibrium  is  determined  by  each  spouse's  voluntary  contributions  to 
household public goods (Lundberg and Pollak 1993).7
Choosing  the  relevant  threat  point  has  important  implications  regarding  the 
prediction of household bargaining models. Predictions from divorce-threat bargaining 
models differ considerably from models that posit non-cooperation as the fall-back option 
(Adam et al. 2003, Anderson and Eswaran 2007, Pollack 1994). For example, Anderson 
and  Eswaran  (2007)  are  able  to  reject  the  prediction  from divorce-threat  bargaining 
models  that  unearned  income  has  a  greater  impact  than  earned  income  on  women's 
bargaining power in Bangladesh,  where divorce is  highly uncommon.  Instead,  in line 
with predictions  from bargaining models  using non-cooperation as the relevant  threat 
point, they argue that it is the control that women exert over their own earnings in the 
non-cooperative  outcome  that  can  shift  the  balance  of  power  within  the  household. 
Relatedly, they show that there is no difference between pure housewives (who do not 
contribute to household income) and women working on their husbands' farms because 
the latter do not exert control over the income generated from their labour. 
We model bargaining within the household as a game of alternating offers with both 
divorce (also referred herein as the exit or outside option) and non-cooperation within the 
household (in the definition proposed by Lundberg and Pollak recalled above) as relevant 
fall-back options.8 We briefly develop the model  and discuss its  main insights in  the 
context of development interventions that seek to shift the balance of power within the 
household with the aim of achieving broader societal transformations.
7 In traditional patriarchal societies, this involves women meeting their traditional obligations as mothers, 
wives,  and daughters-in-law such as child-bearing and performing household chores.  For men, this 
includes  fulfilling  their  roles  as  primary  breadwinners  and  meeting  their  obligations  towards  their 
parents, community and kinship group.
8 Kanbur and Haddad (1994) propose a similar model of household bargaining and touch upon some of 
the  results  discussed  here.  However,  given  our  focus  on  microfinance  interventions  and  gender 
empowerment, our interpretation of the model and the results are considerably different from those of 
Kanbur and Haddad (who consider the question whether households grow more or less equal as they 
grow richer).  Moreover,  our  analysis  is  carried  out  in  a  more  general  setting (utility  functions  are 
weakly concave rather than linear as in the model of Kanbur and Haddad).
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2.1  A Bargaining Model of the Household
Consider the husband m and the wife f of a household. Each spouse has one unit of 
labour  available  that  has  to  be  allocated  between  an  autonomous  activity  and  a 
cooperative activity. The former has a return of wi per unit of labour, i {∈ m,f}, while the 
total  output from cooperation equals f(lm,lf),  li being the amount  of time spent on the 
cooperative activity by spouse i. We assume f(.) is increasing in both inputs. Moreover, 
f(0,lf)=f(lm,0)=0; i.e. some input from both spouses is essential for the activity to generate 
any output. The output from the cooperative activity can be sold on the market at price p. 
We define a potentially different set of autonomous activities in the event of divorce with 
income streams em and ef, which represent the exit options of the household members. 
There is  a single consumption  good with unit  price  and each  household member 
derives utility from own consumption only. For ease of analysis, we consider the case 
where husband and wife have identical preferences over private consumption, described 
by the utility function U(.). We make the standard assumption that U is increasing and 
concave.
In the absence of any agreement about how to share the gains from revenues from 
cooperation, each spouse devotes all her labour time to the autonomous activity for a total 
income of wi  (over which he or she has full control thereafter). Such an outcome may not 
be  Pareto  efficient9,  so  that  there  is  scope  for  gains  from  cooperation  within  the 
household. Following Bergstrom (1996), we assume that in each period, either spouse 
may  propose  an  allocation  of  household  resources  --  i.e.  an  allocation  of  household 
labour across the three activities as well as a division of total household income between 
the two spouses. More precisely, each spouse will have the opportunity to make such a 
proposal in alternative periods that her partner may, then, accept or refuse. If the partner 
accepts, then resources are allocated according to the proposal during that period and in 
all subsequent periods until either spouse chooses to break the agreement. In addition, 
either spouse may choose to walk away from the marriage in any period, in which case he 
or  she would receive  the income  ef in  each  period thereafter  (once  the marriage  has 
broken down, there is no scope of renegotiation possible).
Note that we have assumed, implicitly, that when a couple come to an agreement, 
they are  able  to  commit  to  making  any necessary transfers  at  the  end of  production 
process in line with the division of household resources they have agreed upon. Under 
9 In the sense that cooperation within the household could make at least one household member better-off 
without making any other member worse-off. 
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this  assumption,  any  rational  proposal  will  involve  an  efficient  allocation  of  labour 
resources within the household; for consumption decisions can be made independently of 
production choices. (In section 2.3, we discuss how relaxing this assumption would affect 
our results). Thus, the total household income in any cooperative agreement will be given 
by the following maximisation problem:
[1]
Thus, the only substantive issue to be decided upon in the bargaining process is how the 
income T(p,wm,wf)  will  be  divided  between  the  spouses.  In  effect,  we have  here  the 
bargaining  game analysed  by Rubinstein  (1982)  with  the  modification  introduced  by 
Binmore (1985). Binmore showed that the two parties reach an agreement immediately 
and, if the time lapse between proposals is infinitesimally small, then the total income 
shares of the two parties are given by the solution to the following problem:
[2]
where β=1-α . Here, α and β are the income shares of the husband and wife respectively. 
It  is  evident  from  the  maximisation  problem  described  in  [2]  that  the  utility  levels 
achieved  under  non-cooperation  and  from  divorce  both  influence  the  outcome  of 
bargaining.  Intuitively, a spouse who can fend for herself in a non-cooperative household 
will not be pressured by her partner into accepting an agreement that is biased against her 
in exchange of a return to cooperation. By contrast, if she has little autonomy within the 
household,  she may acquiesce to an unfavourable agreement to end a conflict.  In the 
second case, a strong exit option protects her from having to suffer an arrangement that is 
very biased against her, for when faced with the prospect of such an arrangement, her 
divorce option becomes a credible threat. The axiomatic approach adopted by Lundberg 
and Pollak (1993) overlooks the role played by the exit options in the bargaining process 
when one spouse has little scope of autonomy within the household. Manser and Brown 
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(1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981), also using an axiomatic approach, allow the exit 
options to affect the outcome of bargaining, but, as pointed out by Bergstrom (1996), not 
in  the  manner  that  is  predicted  by  non-cooperative  bargaining  theory.  By  explicitly 
modeling the bargaining process, we are able to show precisely how both the possibility 
of non-cooperation and divorce affect decision-making within the household. 
2.2  An Interpretation of the Model in the Context of the Household Economy
Before considering how this framework may be used to investigate the impact of a 
development programme on bargaining power within the household, we discuss briefly 
how the parameters p, wm, wf   should be interpreted. Note that wi  is the return on labour 
that spouse i can achieve within the limits of the socially recognised division of labour 
for her gender, without the cooperation of her spouse. In the absence of a cooperative 
agreement, the gender norms also recognise her right to retain control over this income. 
In  a  patriarchal  setting,  women  may  be  dependent  on  men  in  carrying  out  their 
entrepreneurial activities at least at some stage of production or marketing.10 In this case, 
the return from her labour would be captured by the parameter  p rather than wf  ; i.e. it 
should be considered a cooperative activity. Likewise, a productive activity that is carried 
out primarily by the man but relies on some input from the female spouse, and from 
which  she  can  credibly  threaten  to  withdraw cooperation,  would  be  captured  by  the 
parameter p rather than wm.11 
It should be evident that there will be considerable heterogeneity in the parameters p, 
wm, wf  across households according to the skill levels of the spouses, the availability of 
complementary inputs provided by each, and their ability to work together in an activity 
that requires coordination and cooperation. For example, a low value of  p can serve to 
represent an extremely conflictual relationship where there is little scope of cooperation 
within the household. In this case, the spouses are likely to engage in largely autonomous 
activities.12 A household where the female spouse has  strong entrepreneurial skills, has 
the necessary capital for her enterprise, and can operate it independently of her husband 
10 For example, in the context of Bangladeshi rural households, Goetz and Gupta (1996) note that “the 
household is a joint venture, and the gender division of labor is such that full, individual control of the 
productive process is virtually impossible for women given the gendered nature of access to markets.” 
(p.53)
11 For example,  in  a  number  of  cases  women borrowers  of the SEDP programme studied by Kabeer 
(1998) supplied their spouses with credit to set up their own business, purchased land for them to farm, 
or a rickshaw for the husband's use.
12 This equilibrium is equivalent to the situation described by Kabeer (2001) as “divorce within marriage” 
(p.74). The spouses remain married because of the social stigma associated with divorce. 
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would be characterised by a high value of wf.13 If a woman who has no  opportunity for 
work other than on her husband's farm, the household would be characterised by low wf. 
Moreover, if her input in farm work is easily substitutable, then the return from the man's 
labour in joint production (on the farm) will be close to wm.14 
Financial  capital  is  a  complementary  input  that  can  potentially  raise  the  labour 
returns of household members and, therefore, providing access to credit can be expected 
to raise some or all of the parameters  p, wm, wf  . However, the same credit programme 
may affect these parameters differently across households. Intuitively, if the husband has 
much greater entrepreneurial competence than the woman, than the availability of credit 
will strongly affect  wm   but not  wf  . If the credit  programme makes it possible for the 
household to undertake an enterprise where the spouses provide complementary inputs, 
we would observe an increase in p but, potentially, not in wm or wf .
We shall assume for that any new financial capital that is brought into the household 
will be allocated efficiently across the different household activities. However, given that 
capital investments made today will affect the fall-back options of household members in 
the future, they have an incentive to appropriate, if possible, any new resources brought 
into  the  household  to  strengthen  their  future  bargaining  position.  We  explore  this 
possibility in section 2.3.
2.3  The Impact of a Development Programme on Intra-Household Bargaining
We now consider how the decision-making process within a household is affected by 
a  development  programme  that  affects  (a)  the  return  p on  cooperation  within  the 
household;  (b)  the  returns  wm and  wf per  unit  of  labour  devoted  to  the  autonomous 
activity; and (c) the spouses' exit options (em and ef). We show that the impact of any type 
of intervention depends critically on whether or not divorce is a credible threat point. The 
threat of divorce may not be used for two reasons: first, because exiting the marriage is 
not a realistic  option and,  thus, the threat is not credible;  or because non-cooperation 
serves  as  a  much  more  effective  bargaining  tool.  The  first  proposition  addresses  the 
13 Kabeer (1998) provides a number of examples of women who can be placed in this category. In some 
cases, they had overcome traditional gender restrictions: one earned as income as an itinerant trader, 
another owned a grocery shop in the main bazaar. Others had found an effective solution within these 
restriction such as the woman who reared a cow and sold its milk 'in the neighbourhood',  thus not 
having to rely on a male household member for marketing.
14 Anderson and Eswaran (2007) found, also in the context of rural women in Bangladesh, that women 
who work on their husband's farm and those who do not engage in any income-generating activities had 
similarly low levels of decision-making authority within the household. This suggests that women who 
worked  on  their  husband's  farms  had  no  more  scope  to  engage  in  autonomous  activities  than  did 
housewives. 
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situation where the threat of divorce does not factor into the bargaining process for either 
spouse.
Proposition  1: Suppose  that  the  participation  constraint  is  not  binding  for  either  
individual in the bargaining solution.
(i) Then for some α1 ,α2 , satisfying  α1 < ½ < α2  the man’s share in the division of  
household  resources, α* is increasing in wm for α ≤  α2 and decreasing in w
f for α ≤  α1 ;
(ii) If α* > ½, then α*  is decreasing in p and vice versa if α* < ½;
(iii) For α ≤ α2, α
∗ is more sensitive to a change in wf than to a change in p that  
has the same impact on aggregate household income; correspondingly, for α ≥ α1, α
* is  
more sensitive to a change in wm than to a change in p that has the same impact on  
aggregate household income;   
(iv) changes in em  and ef have no impact on α*.
The first result contained in Proposition 1 is well-known in the literature on intra-
household  bargaining:  increasing  the  scope of  autonomy of  one  spouse  yields  her  a 
greater share of household resources. More significantly, as we point out in part 2 of the 
proposition,  an  increase  in  the  gains  from  cooperation  also  shifts  relative  bargaining 
powers within the household in favour of the more disempowered spouse. 
According to the third part of the proposition, gains in the cooperative sphere will 
have  a  smaller  impact  on  relative  bargaining  powers  than  an  equivalent  gain  in  the 
autonomous sphere of the more disempowered spouse. This does not mean that policies 
that target the cooperative sphere within the household are necessarily less effective at 
changing  intra-household  relations  than  those  that  target  the  autonomous  spheres. 
Precisely because programmes that target the cooperative sphere have a smaller impact 
on relative bargaining powers within the household, they are likely to have a net positive 
impact on the welfare of the more empowered spouse, who would consequently be more 
supportive of the initiative than if it had focused exclusively on the autonomous sphere of 
his partner. Therefore, to the extent that the more empowered spouse has the authority to 
determine  a  household's  participation  in  a  development  programme,  targeting  the 
cooperative sphere may ultimately have a greater impact on intra-household relations. In 
the following section,  we shall  explicitly allow household members to make strategic 
choices regarding programme participation and production to illustrate this point.
Next,  we  analyse  the  case  for  households  where  bargaining  relations  within  the 
household are extremely asymmetric, such that exit from the marriage is a credible threat-
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point for one of the spouses.15 We ask how, in this case, interventions that affect the gains 
from  cooperation  and  the  independent  incomes  from  non-cooperation  and  divorce 
influence the solution to the bargaining game. We have the following proposition:
Proposition  2: Suppose,  for  a  particular  household,  the  bargaining  problem  has  a  
corner solution with f receiving the same utility in the agreement as she would from her  
exit option. Then,
(i) an increase in p, wf, wm  will increase α*; i.e. it raises the man’s share of the  
surplus; 
(ii) an increase in ef will lower α∗, while an increase in em  will have no impact on  
the bargaining solution.
Proof of Proposition 2: Since the participation constraint of f is binding, we have 
If this equation is to hold following an increase in p, wf,, and wm, it must be accompanied  
by an increase in α∗. Following the same logic, an increase in ef would lead to a decrease 
in  α∗.  On the  other  hand,  since  em does  not  appear  in  the  equation,  changes  in  this  
variable would not affect α .∗
Thus  we  observe  considerable  heterogeneity  in  the  impact  of  different  types  of 
interventions  across  households.  Where  the  exit  option  serves  as  a  credible  threat, 
increasing  the  gains  of  cooperation  (through  an  increase  in  the  price  of  the  jointly 
produced  good) actually  decreases the  share  of  the  spouse  f who  is  against  her 
participation  constraint.  In  addition,  increasing  her  range  of  economic  opportunities 
within marriage  wf would similarly  decrease her share of the surplus from cooperation. 
By contrast, strengthening her exit option ef  will lead to an increase in her share.
The first two parts of Proposition 2 have a simple intuitive explanation. When exit 
from the marriage becomes a credible threat point, there is, in effect, no more bargaining 
taking place within the household. The better-off spouse need only ensure that his partner 
is receiving just enough utility within the marriage so as not to opt for her exit option. As 
the household becomes richer, it becomes cheaper for him to do so: his partner will be 
content  with  staying  in  the  marriage  for  an  even  smaller  share  of  the  gains  from 
cooperation.16
15 For example, the threat of divorce may serve as a bargaining tool for the husband if he has an attractive 
exit option relative to non-cooperation within the household; or for the wife if non-cooperation within 
the household is a unattractive outcome compared with the option of divorce.
16  See Kanbur and Haddad (1994), who find similar results
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Thus far, we have assumed that production and consumption decisions within the 
household are separable  and that  the allocation  of  capital  and labour  across different 
activities will be efficient. However, production decisions can, in themselves, affect the 
fall-back  options  of  the  spouses,  and  thus  the  outcome  of  subsequent  bargaining. 
Therefore,  unless  members  of  the  household  can  ex-ante commit  to  a  plan  for  the 
allocation of productive resources and division of the profits,  they have incentives  to 
behave  strategically  when  making  production  decisions.  Since  this  possibility  has 
implications  about  the  extent  to  which  a  microcredit  programme  can  affect  relative 
bargaining positions within the household, we explore it in greater detail in the following 
section.
2.4  Strategic Choices in Programme Participation and Loan Use
Imagine that access to credit will enable one spouse, say the woman, to substantially 
expand her autonomous activities. Then her husband may have an incentive to subvert the 
process of loan take-up and loan use to maintain his own bargaining power within the 
household. At an intuitive level, the husband is most likely to make such strategic choices 
if the woman is initially “disempowered” in the decision-making process. What would be 
the impact of a credit programme on the household in such situations? 
In effect, we are presented here with a dynamic problem: the household is faced with 
a decision that  will itself influence the decision-making process within the household. 
Basu (2006) proposes an innovative approach to determine the equilibrium decision in 
such a situation.  We do not adopt the same approach here as Basu abstracts away from 
modeling the bargaining process, which is a key element  in the analytical  framework 
presented above. Instead, we consider a special case of the problem  which is especially 
pertinent in the context of microcredit interventions in societies with strongly patriarchal 
norms:  we assume that the institutional  setup (i.e. the societal  norms and/or the bank 
policy), or the initial bargaining situation, is such that the husband can overrule his wife's 
decision to join a credit programme, or appropriate the loans for his own use once the 
loan is received.17 
Note that the issue of appropriation does not arise if the most productive use of new 
17 Given that participation in a microfinance programme is a public and formal activity, it is doubtful that 
a woman would be able to join such a programme without her husband's knowledge. It is also doubtful 
that microfinance providers would lend money to a woman not knowing whether the husband agrees or 
not since they rely on the resource base of the whole household to ultimately repay the loan (Rahman 
1999 provides  a  number of  narratives  involving borrowers  of Grameen Bank which illustrates  this 
mechanism). 
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capital  lies in the man's autonomous sphere. Nor does it arise if the woman has little 
autonomy within the household and her divorce option is a credible threat. In the first 
case, efficiency alone would justify allocation of the loan to the male activity and its 
impact on the allocation of household income would be as described in Propositions 1 
and 2. In the second case, the man would have no incentive to divert the asset from its 
most  efficient  use  because  his  strong bargaining  position  ensures  that  any additional 
income generated by the household will accrue to him, as stated in Proposition 2. Rather, 
we are concerned with the case where the most productive use of new capital lies in the 
woman's autonomous sphere and her non-cooperative threat point is sufficiently strong to 
ensure that she can retain a share of any additional income she generates. If the final say 
with regard to financial decisions rests with the man, would he permit her to use the loan 
to expand her autonomous activity and thereby strengthen her bargaining position? In 
deciding whether to allow his wife to use the loan in her own activity, the man faces a 
trade-off  between  efficiency  and  bargaining  power.  He  can  prevent  his  wife  from 
strengthening her bargaining position by diverting the loan to his own activity, but the 
household as a whole would be poorer in consequence. We present the condition under 
which  the  man  has  the  incentive  to  appropriate  a  productive  asset  from his  wife  in 
Proposition 3: 
Proposition 3:  Suppose the husband m has the ability to appropriate an asset and  
use it in his own production process. Then, he would appropriate an asset whose most  
efficient  use  lies  in  the  woman's  autonomous sphere  if  and only  if  her  participation  
constraint is not binding, and
[3]
where w2
i,w1
i , are, respectively, the returns to labour in the autonomous sphere of  
i {m,f} with and without the asset in question∈
The  condition  in  [3]  represents  the  strategic  choice  facing  the  man  when  his 
appropriation of a loan (or any other productive asset) would raise his labour returns from 
w1
m
  to w2
m  while allowing his wife to invest the loan in her own activity would raise her 
labour returns from w1
f
  to w2
f . (If the wife's participation constraint binds, i.e. her divorce 
threat is credible, then the husband has no incentive to appropriate the asset as he is able 
to appropriate any additional income she generates, as stated in Proposition 2). It is clear 
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from the condition that it is more likely to be satisfied when (w2
m – w1
m) is comparable to 
(w2
f – w1
f). Intuitively, the man has the strongest incentive to appropriate the loan when he 
can  use  it  nearly  as  productively  as  the  woman,  such  that  the  efficiency  loss  from 
appropriation is small relative to the gain in bargaining power. In other words, the risk of 
loan appropriation is strong when men have a alternative venture in which the capital can 
yield comparable returns. Even if no such venture exists, the husband would choose to 
veto participation in the loan programme if the right-hand side of [3] were negative.
Given  that  gains  in  the  cooperative  sphere  within  the  household  also  affects 
bargaining relations in a household with an unequal distribution of power (Proposition 
1(ii)), a man may also have a strategic incentive to appropriate a loan that can be used 
most productively in a joint activity with his wife.18 However, his incentive for doing so 
is  necessarily  weaker  than  in  the  case  discussed  above  because  an  expansion  in  the 
cooperative sphere has a smaller impact on his bargaining position than an equivalent 
expansion  in  the  woman's  autonomous  sphere  (Proposition  1(iii)).  Therefore,  the 
possibility of strategic appropriation by the man is lower when the loan can be used in a 
cooperative activity than when its best use lies in the woman's autonomous sphere. 
2.5  Heterogenous Impact of Credit Programmes across Households
The stylised framework of the household economy we have developed can account 
for  a  variety  of  outcomes  described  in  ethnographic  studies  regarding  household 
responses to credit programmes.  In particular, the theoretical results developed in the 
preceding  sections  allow us  to  distinguish  between different  types  of  intra-household 
relations and predict, in each case, what would be the impact of a microcredit programme 
that targets women. We shall use the wide array of intra-household relations documented 
in  Naila  Kabeer's  (1998,  2001)  study  of  women  participating  in  the  SEDP  credit 
programme in Bangladesh to illustrate the model's predictions.
First, consider a household for which p is very small relative to wm and wf . Then, in 
equilibrium, each spouse allocates all of his or her labour to her autonomous sphere, and 
consumes  the  income generated  in  this  sphere.  No bargaining  takes  place  within  the 
household as there is no surplus to bargain over. These parameter values can represent an 
extremely  conflictual  relation  within  the  household,  where  there  is  no  scope  for  the 
spouses to cooperate in a joint activity. Kabeer (2001), in providing a characterisation of 
women borrowers in a microcredit programme in Bangladesh, refers to such a situation as 
18 We do not formally provide the conditions under which appropriation of this kind would occur as the 
logic of the argument and the insights are essentially the same.
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one of “divorce within marriage”, wherein women were able to use their loans “to create 
a parallel economy for themselves which gave them considerable financial independence 
from their husbands” (Kabeer 2001, p.74). In terms of the model, if the availability of 
credit enables the woman to become more productive in her autonomous activity, then 
the gains will necessarily accrue to her. As her husband receives only the income from 
his own activity,  his welfare will be unaffected. Thus, we have an example where the 
woman's access to credit has a direct, unambiguously positive impact on her welfare.
Second, consider a household where wf is small relative to p and wm. In this case, the 
woman  has  few  options  to  provide  for  herself  if  cooperation  breaks  down  in  the 
household. As her non-cooperative threat-point is weak, the man may be able to extract 
all the surplus above her utility from exit. In this situation, the availability of credit will 
not improve the woman's welfare, in whichever activity the loan may be used. As stated 
in Proposition 2, all income gains will accrue to the man and, indeed, there will be a 
strengthening in his bargaining position (as measured by his  share of total  household 
income in the outcome of bargaining). Kabeer (1998) provides a number of examples of 
women  borrowers  whose  situation  corresponded  well  with  the  outcome  predicted  in 
Proposition 2. Although the household relied on them for access to credit and, in some 
instances, they made substantial labour contributions to the loan-related activity, they had 
no control over - and sometimes little knowledge of - the income generated using their 
loans.
Third, consider a household where p is high relative to both wm  and wf. This means 
that both spouses provide valuable inputs in a cooperative activity. This may be a female 
enterprise in which the man provides essential inputs like marketing or a male enterprise 
where the woman's input is highly valued. Kabeer (1998, 2001), provides a number of 
accounts of marriages that can be placed in one or the other of these categories. If the 
most  productive  use  of  additional  capital  is  in  the  cooperative  sphere,  then  the 
introduction of a credit programme will further increase  p. In Kabeer's interviews, the 
women involved in such joint activities (in some cases, 'joint' simply because the woman 
was  the  conduit  for  an  essential  input,  namely  credit)  indicated  that  they  played  an 
important role in deciding how the profits generated using the loan activity would be 
used. In this sense, they had experienced an increase in welfare as a result of their access 
to  credit.  In terms of  the model,  if  the most  productive  use of  new capital  is  in  the 
cooperative sphere, then the introduction of a credit programme will lead to an increase 
in  p. Then, as stated in Proposition 1, the allocation of household income between the 
spouses will shift in favour of the more disempowered spouse.
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Lastly,  consider a household where a microcredit  loan would enable a woman to 
expand her autonomous sphere, and her activity provides the most efficient means for 
using  the  loan  within  the  household.  However,  as  implied  by  Proposition  3,  if  her 
husband has an alternative means of using capital that is reasonably profitable, he has an 
incentive to appropriate the loan. In this case, the end result  of the credit programme 
would be to weaken the woman's bargaining position within the household (though her 
welfare  may  still  improve).  It  would  be  difficult  to  identify  instances  of  such 
appropriation  in  empirical  studies  since  it  requires  being  able  to  distinguish  between 
efficient use of a loan in a male activity and strategic appropriation of the loan by a man 
to  retain  his  bargaining  position.  Nevertheless,  the  man's  strategic  incentive  to 
appropriate the loan identified in the model may account partly for the large fraction of 
loans  given  to  women  through  microfinance  programmes  being  invested  in  male-
dominated activities, as noted earlier. 
The four  scenarios  discussed  above show that  the  availability  of  credit  allows  a 
woman to strengthen her bargaining position within the household through an expansion 
of her autonomous activities only in very specific cases. For this process to occur, it must 
be that not only is the woman able to invest new capital profitably in an autonomous 
activity, but also that her husband has no alternative activity in which the same capital 
would  generate  comparable  returns.  While  it  is  true  that  in  a  highly  conflictual 
relationship  the  availability  of  credit  can  improve  her  welfare,  it  does  not,  strictly 
speaking,  enable her  to  strengthen her  bargaining position  since there is  no marriage 
surplus  to  bargain  over.  We  note  also  that  for  highly  disempowered  women,  credit 
interventions will not have any impact on her welfare as all income gains will accrue to 
the husband. The case in which it  is  most  likely that the availability of credit  would 
enable the woman to strengthen her bargaining position within the household is when 
capital can be invested in a cooperative activity to which both spouses contribute in an 
important way.
3  Conclusion
Our aim in this paper was to provide a critical perspective on the theory underlying 
gender targeting in microcredit  programmes and its possible effect on intra-household 
relations.  In the literature,  this  issue is  often regarded as being closely related to the 
question of whether women with greater  autonomous  control  over assets  and income 
within  the  household  have  greater  say  in  household  decisions,  while,  in  policy 
discussions, empirical findings on  the latter question  often serve to motivate or justify 
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targeting women for microcredit.
To investigate how providing a household access to credit affects the allocation of 
resources  and  intra-household  decision-making,  we  developed  a  simple  theoretical 
framework  distinguishing  between  three  alternatives  facing  individuals  within  the 
household - exit, autonomy and cooperation - and the type of production possible under 
each alternative. Unlike most of the literature on the theory of intra-household allocation, 
we explicitly model the process of bargaining within the household to examine how the 
possibility of exit or autonomy affects the decision-making process.
Even  this  simple  framework  reveals  a  wide  range  of  possible  outcomes  for 
households provided with access to new credit. Depending on the initial balance of power 
in the household and the potential of each household member to undertake or participate 
in an entrepreneurial  activity,  the introduction of a credit  programme may lead to (i) 
greater  cooperation  in  household  production,  and  a  more  egalitarian  intra-household 
allocation of resources; (ii) greater autonomy of the woman in productive activities; (iii) 
appropriation of all additional income generated with the loan by the husband with no 
change  in  welfare  for  the  woman;  and  (iv)  strategic  appropriation  of  the  loan  –  or 
strategic veto of programme participation – by the husband to preserve his bargaining 
power.  The  theory  can  account  for  the  heterogeneity  of  outcomes  across  households 
revealed through careful micro-level studies of micocredit  programmes, such as Naila 
Kabeer (1998, 2001) 's work on the impact of the SEDP credit programme in Bangladesh.
Our model demonstrates that the introduction of a microcredit programme is likely to 
have heterogeneous impacts (Proposition 1) and also adverse effects on the bargaining 
power  of  some  women  (Proposition  2).  Important  sources  of  the  heterogeneity  in 
programme impact include attitudes of husbands and wives regarding gender norms, the 
scope for women's  autonomy in the community,  as well  as pre-intervention  levels  of 
relative  bargaining  power  in  the  household.  Our  theoretical  results  point  to  the 
importance of paying closer attention to the distribution of the gains and losses from the 
intervention.19 To our knowledge, only one impact study has attempted to consider the 
initial bargaining power of female participants prior to the introduction of a microfinance 
programme. Ashraf et al. (2008) analyse the impact on access to a savings product on 
women's  decision-making  power  and  find  that  the  positive  mean  impact  was  largely 
driven  by  initially  less-empowered  women,  while  more  empowered  women  did  not 
19 This is a point made more broadly by Heckman (2005) regarding the evaluation of economic policies in 
general and is particularly important to inform policy-making in developing countries. See Ravallion 
(2008) for the latter point.
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experience any significant effect.20-21
Most importantly, the theory underlines the fact that gender targeting in microcredit 
is  not  equivalent  to  providing  women  with  greater  autonomous  control  over  new 
resources. This is because women are  placed in situations of unequal interdependence 
within the family and have thus little  scope to develop purely autonomous activities. 
Moreover,  strategic  preemptive  behaviour  by  male  spouses  further  restricts  women's 
ability to allocate new loans to their autonomous activities (Proposition 3). We show that 
women  may be able  to  invest  in  their  own independent  activities  only under  special 
circumstances, for instance in very conflictual households, or when women are already 
empowered in the household.
Depending on the socio-cultural  context,  greater  individual  control over resources 
may not be feasible without changes in the underlying structure of gender relations. In the 
impoverished settings in which microfinance projects operate, kinship ties and marriage 
play an important role in providing individuals with legitimate claims over household and 
community  resources,  together  with vital  access  to  an  insurance network  in  times  of 
crisis. Hence, cooperation and jointness of decision-making may be more desirable for 
women than autonomous control over resources. In the words of Kabeer (1998, p.83)
As long as the family, and male guardianship remains women’s greatest source of 
economic and social security, women’s interests are likely to be better served by 
equalising the terms of interdependence within the family rather than seeking to 
establish their autonomy. The mitigation of their dependent status within the family 
so that the perceived ‘jointness’ of family welfare and interests is more equally 
shared by other members is one means by which this is achieved. In this context, 
[...]  the  notion  of  ‘centrality’  [...]  does  seem  to  better  capture  the  processes 
described by the women loanees of moving from marginalisation within household 
decision-making  and  exclusion  within  the  community  to  positions  of  greater 
centrality, inclusion and ‘voice’.
Holding this perspective has important implications regarding our understanding of 
the  empowering  potential  of  microfinance  programmes.  If  the  new  economic 
opportunities lie outside the traditional realm of the female spouse and exit options for 
women are severely limited, then she may be better off ignoring it to preserve her social 
ties within the community. Thus, the empowering potential of microfinance is necessarily 
circumscribed by prevailing gender norms, unless alternatives are offered to women that 
20 More or less empowered women refer to women above or below the baseline median of their measure 
of bargaining power respectively.
21 Note that Karlan (2007) find no impact from access to credit on household decision-making.
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strengthen their outside options in a credible manner. The magnitude of this latter effort 
should not be underestimated. Changing women's outside options requires special efforts 
and strong political will, as evidenced by the history of women's emancipation in Europe 
and in developing countries alike.22
In addition, because of the possibility of strategic preemptive behaviour on the part of 
the male spouse, an intervention that requires the cooperation of both spouses or ensures 
that  male  spouses  also  benefit  (or  do  not  lose)  from it,  may  be  more  successful  at 
achieving  wider social  impacts  than interventions  that  focus on women's  autonomous 
spheres  only.  However,  the  difficulty  in  designing  policies  that  engender  cooperation 
within the household should not be underestimated. Providing incentives for cooperation 
between  spouses23 can  also  be  fraught  with  problems  and  may  have  unintended 
consequences, as evidenced by a study on pastoral women in Northern Kenya (Doss and 
McPeak 2005).24
A final point worth emphasizing is that, although women may not retain control over 
their  loans  during  the  productive  process,  loss  of  control  should  not  necessarily  be 
equated with loss of bargaining power. Instead, as evident from the formal theory on 
bargaining, the relative bargaining strengths within a couple depend on how much each 
spouse brings  to  the  productive  process  in  a  cooperative  agreement;  the  impact  of  a 
22  In their study of women's participation in economic activities outside of the household in developing 
countries, Morrisson and Jutting (2005) conclude: “In sum, if social institutions in developing countries 
discriminate against women, policy measures aiming to improve their situation via improved access to 
education and health will have only a limited impact. [...]  If custom forbids outside work for women, 
the enrollment  rate  of  girls  in  primary schools  can  double without  entailing an increase  in  female 
participation in the labor market. If custom goes against accepting that women can be in a position to 
exercise  authority,  the enrollment  rate  in universities  can double without  increasing the number of 
women  managers.  These  examples  show  that  to  increase  the  effectiveness  of  country  and  donor 
policies, measures to address the institutional framework have to be undertaken” (pp. 1066, 1078). At 
the same time, overcoming these social institutional constraints is not easy, as highlighted by Pezzini 
(2005)'s study of twelve European countries, which shows that abortion rights and the pill did have 
significant effects on women's welfare, but that other women’s rights (e.g. mutual consent divorce laws 
and high maternity protection on the job) were less effective or even counter-productive.
23  Armendariz  de  Aghion  and  Roome  (2008)  recently  conducted  an  experiment  in  Mexico,  which 
consisted  in  allowing  women  to  invite  their  husbands  to  join  a  Self-Help  Group  under  different 
scenarios. Results from this experiment are still pending.
24  The women in question required the cooperation of their husbands to market dairy milk in response to 
new market opportunities. However,  Doss and McPeak (2005) find that instead of cooperating with 
their wives, men made migration decisions that limited their wives' ability to market milk. Note that 
Doss and McPeak (2005) are careful  not  to argue that  non-cooperation between spouses over  milk 
marketing and migration decisions will  automatically have a negative impact of household welfare. 
Similarly, it is  not obvious that women's milk marketing plans will have positive welfare effects. The 
welfare impacts of non-cooperation (or contestation to use Doss and McPeak's expression) within the 
household need to be made explicit and further explored empirically.  See also Lundberg and Pollak 
(2003), who provide a theoretical discussion of such strategic decisions within the household.
20
microcredit  programme  depends  on  how  the  introduction  of  new  capital  reshapes 
household production,  and draws upon the skills  and inputs of the two spouses. This 
result  casts  a  new light  on  complementary  interventions  such  as  entrepreneurship  or 
business training programmes, to the extent that they succeed in increasing the value of a 
woman's contribution to a cooperative activity in her household.
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